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I. Introduction 
Many countries in the European Union have amassed enormous debts in recent years. 
From 2010 to 2012, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece have averaged debt to GDP ratios of 
118.3, 71.67, 111.27, and 159.2 respectively. Throughout this time period, Greece has 
experienced differential treatment in regards to its bonds when compared to these other periphery 
countries. This differential treatment is clearly indicated by the difference in credit default swap 
spreads. From 2010 to 2012, Greece had an average spread of 4,687 basis points, while Italy, 
Spain, and Portugal had spreads of 400, 346, and 680 points respectively. Among other factors, 
such as ownership of debt, cross-country ties due to Basel I-II-III, and eurozone specific criteria 
(level of debt and budget deficit), an important factor is the debt perception. The objective of this 
study is to investigate the factors that affect the market perception of sovereign debt. 
Since the financial crisis that occurred in 2008, most of the economies in the world have 
been trying to get back on track. Countries, like the United States, are seeing signs of recovery. 
However, across the Atlantic Ocean, financial problems are still raging with no end in sight. 
Over the past couple of years, the Euro has been devalued significantly, unemployment has 
increased in many countries, and economic growth has been nonexistent.  
  Currently in the European Union, Greece is at the center of the economic turmoil. Since 
the financial crisis, Greece has experienced two bailouts and is currently undergoing negotiations 
to restructure their debts. However, Greece is not the only European country dealing with 
mounting sovereign debt issues. Spain and Italy, economies much larger than that of Greece, are 
also experiencing increasing debt levels. All three of these nations currently have debt levels 
exceeding their gross domestic products. This leads to the question; what is sovereign debt, and 
why is it important? 
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Sovereign debt provides a method that countries can use to gain access to government 
funds that would not normally be available. Sovereign debt has many uses, including financing 
projects, conducting monetary policy through bond purchases, and financing government 
spending. However, when debt begins to grow and interest rates increase, it can be a crippling 
burden for countries. In this context, a key factor is the market perception of a country’s debt. 
Market perception encompasses risk that cannot be valued. Measurement of perception allows 
for a more thorough understanding of the pricing of debt.  
This paper utilizes data on credit default swap spreads (CDS spreads) from 2005-2014 for 
17 eurozone countries.
1
The goal of this analysis is to determine how market perception factors 
into the variation of CDS spreads. Using economic variables, a fixed effect regression is 
implemented with interaction terms to measure differences in CDS spreads across European 
countries. Additionally, a perception index was calculated to quantify perception differences 
across periphery countries.
2
 
The fixed effect regression confirmed the hypothesis that Greece had significantly higher 
CDS spreads than other countries in the sample. The largest interaction coefficient for Greece 
eclipsed 7,000, while the other periphery countries’ largest interaction coefficients were in the 
100’s. The perception index presented similar results. Greece’s CDS were found to be 4 to 5 
times greater than they should have been based on economic fundamentals, while no other 
periphery country was found to have this discrepancy in CDS spreads. This evidence fuels the 
argument that Greek debt was treated differently than the other countries, and that market 
perception may be a factor behind this differential. 
                                                          
1
 Countries Included: Germany, Italy, Spain, France, Greece, Portugal, Hungary, Austria, Bulgaria, Iceland, Sweden, 
Belgium, Croatia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
2
 The periphery countries are Greece, Spain, Italy, and Portugal. 
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The remainder of this paper is split into four sections. The second section presents a 
comprehensive literature review of optimal currency areas, the European Union, and debt and 
market perception, while the following section will explain the data. The third section includes 
two methodologies, and the final section is the results of the analysis.  
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II. Literature Review 
Optimal Currency Areas 
The formation of the European Union was a culmination of political, cultural, and economic 
factors. In this review, we will delve deeper into the economic factors. The driving theory behind 
the eurozone is optimal currency area theory. The definition of an optimal currency area is “[A] 
geographic area in which a single currency would create the greatest economic benefit” 
(Investopedia). The theory behind OCA’s has been developed over decades of studies and 
research. We will review the ideas that create the foundation for an optimal currency area.  
 The first idea that is important to OCA theory was factor mobility. Mundell (1961) 
specifically cites labor mobility as the crucial factor that allows OCA’s to function, using an 
example with two separate regions (A and B) that have fixed exchange rates. If the demand shifts 
from region A’s products to region B’s, this will cause inflation in region B and unemployment 
in region A. If exchange rates were flexible, some of this would be mitigated. However, since 
they are not, another variable must adjust to restore equilibrium. Mundell makes the case that 
this must be labor mobility. The ability of labor to move from recessionary region A to the 
booming B region gets rid of the pressures of unemployment and inflation that would normally 
be corrected through an exchange rate.  
In 1963, McKinnon built upon this idea by splitting factor mobility into mobility among 
regions and mobility of industries. He stated that if the negatively impacted region can create 
products similar to the demanded product, then labor mobility is not needed. If this replication 
cannot occur, then mobility is required. Then, in 1969, Kenen imposed a condition on Mundell’s 
idea by stating that for this to be true, the entire work force must have a similar skill set or the 
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work must be similar. Otherwise, it would not be possible for workers to travel from one region 
to another and bring about equilibrium.  
The next addition made to OCA theory was also from McKinnon (1963). He stated that 
the more open an economy is, the more advantageous it will find a fixed exchange rate system. 
His argument states that when there is a very open economy, the prices of foreign goods are 
more likely to be factored into the domestic cost of living. This reduces money illusion and 
causes prices and wages to be influenced more by changes in the exchange rate. This makes 
exchange rates less efficient as an adjustment mechanism for an economy therefore meaning that 
smaller countries would be better off joining larger economies. The idea behind this is that that 
larger economies are more self-sufficient, and therefore do not need as many imports.  
 In 1969, Kenen added another idea to OCA theory by advocating for the diversification 
of products. It was Kenen’s belief that perfect labor mobility rarely exists, and because of this, he 
believed that, “…diversity in a nation’s product mix, the number of single-product regions 
contained in a single country, may be more relevant than labour mobility” (Kenen 1969). If a 
country with a fixed exchange rate produces a small number of products and a negative demand 
shock occurs, then the natural adjustment method, the exchange rate, cannot be used. This results 
in unemployment for the area. This is why it is important for OCA’s to have product 
diversification. In this case, a single negative demand shock will not affect the area nearly as 
much because it is only felt in one of many sectors.  
Ingram (1962) was the first person to introduce financial integration into OCA theory. 
Financial integration allows for capital to flow more easily. When one area is experiencing a 
negative shock, capital flows to this area help reduce the impact of the shock. Once the effects of 
the shock are no longer felt, the capital will be redistributed. “With a high degree of financial 
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integration, even modest changes in interest rates would elicit equilibrating capital movements 
across partner countries. This would reduce differences in long-term interest rates, easing the 
financing of external imbalances but also fostering an efficient allocation of resources” 
(Mongelli 2008).
 This idea is similar to that of Mundell’s labor mobility. 
A final point for this section is Corden’s addition in 1972. He was concerned with the 
potential loss of control of monetary and exchange rate policy. Additionally, by forming a 
currency union with another country, there is a loss of autonomy in the political arena because 
more powerful countries may dictate policy. If a country believes that their monetary policy or 
exchange rates are an effective tool for combating shocks, then autonomy may be the better 
choice. Additionally, Corden (1972) considers inflation preferences of joining countries to be 
very important. Differences in preference for levels of inflation can cause rifts between members 
when trying to decide on policy. All of these ideas provided the foundation of optimal currency 
area theory. In recent years, this theory has been tested through the formation of the European 
Union. The next section will discuss the Maastricht Treaty, which formed the European 
monetary union. 
Maastricht Treaty and Basel Accords 
The Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992, laid the foundation for the European Monetary 
Union. Previously, the “Single European Act” was established in order to create one market 
within Europe. In 1992, “The Single European Market … provided for the free movement of 
goods, persons, services and capital” (Afxentiou 2000). A singular market led to a great push 
toward further monetary unification, and, naturally, the idea of a single currency to use within 
this market was established. However, financially strong countries did not want to be brought 
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down by financially weak countries that also joined the currency. This laid the foundation of the 
convergence criteria that was put forth in the Maastricht Treaty.  
 The Maastricht Treaty lays out four distinct criteria for member states to adhere to in 
order to join the monetary union. These criteria are in place for a couple of reasons. One is that 
they help to create a homogenous economic environment that is required for an optimal currency 
area. The second is because they allow the member states to see whether or not prospective 
members are willing to make economic sacrifices in order to join the monetary union. 
The first fiscal criterion is presented in two parts. The first part states that the government 
deficit cannot be larger than 3% of GDP. The second part of the criterion requires that the 
country’s debt be no greater than 60% of GDP. However, the treaty does allow some leniency 
with these criteria by calling them “reference values”. The treaty states that countries are still 
eligible for membership if their deficits and debt “has declined substantially and continuously 
and reached a level that comes close to the reference value” (Maastricht Treaty 1992).  Afxentiou 
(2000) claims that, “The stability of the euro is reinforced by (these two) criteria, which protect 
the European Union from threats of inflation which may arise from government budget deficits.” 
The second criterion states that prospective member’s inflation level can be no higher 
than 1.5% above the average level of the three lowest inflation members. “Germany particularly 
insisted on adopting this criterion with the view of making the Union’s future monetary policy 
analogous to that of the Bundesbank” (Bukowski). Low inflation rates would help decrease the 
economic uncertainty of adding a new country into the union. Additionally, if all members 
hovered around the same inflation rate, they would be more likely to favor similar monetary 
policies going forward.  
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Criterion three states that the nominal long term interest rate cannot be more than 2% 
greater than the average of the three lowest interest rate countries. Economically, the countries in 
the monetary union benefit from all members sharing a similar interest rate. Since debt from all 
member countries is denominated in the same currency, higher interest rates before joining may 
indicate more risk throughout the monetary union. Again, this criterion was desired by Germany 
because, “Germany was afraid that at a relatively lower interest on their treasury bonds in 
comparison to that in other EU countries, it would have problems with placing them in the 
financial markets” (Bukowski).  
The final criteria of the Maastricht Treaty states that no country desiring membership can 
have exchange rate realignment over a two-year period. This refers to the devaluation of the 
central rate of their currency that is pegged to the euro. Additionally, it is recommended that the 
country join the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM-II), which, “provides the 
framework to manage the exchange rates between EU currencies, and ensures stability” 
(Europa.eu). The reasoning behind this criterion deals with exchange rate fluctuations. 
“Stabilization of the given country’s exchange rate within the ERM-II in the course of 2 years 
means that despite the lack of currency-related restrictions, the exchange rate is affected by 
minimum fluctuations around the central exchange rate” (Bukowski). 
 Although some of these criteria are discussed in optimal currency area theory, it is 
believed that these criteria were not required to function as a monetary union. However, stronger 
countries financially, such as Germany, pushed the enforcement of these criteria. Even if the 
different criteria were not required for an effective currency area, they allowed the current 
members to see if aspiring members were willing to play ball. They provide a sense of security to 
current members when a country undertakes all of these measures in order to gain membership 
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and play a crucial role when considering market perceptions. Requiring these fiscal criteria 
caused markets to believe that countries were changing in terms of fiscal behavior and they gave 
investors a sense of security that these countries were not as risky.   
 In the next section, the Basel Accords will be reviewed. This financial legislation is 
crucial to the topic of Greek and European debt as it directly impacts how the market perceived 
the sovereign debt of countries. 
The Basel Accords 
Basel I 
 The Basel Accords were created to enforce better banking practices. The goal of the 
Basel committee was, “to improve the quality of banking supervision globally providing a better 
understanding in the field of supervision” (Aramburu 2013). This has led to the publishing of 
Basel I, II, and III, which build a framework for improved banking practices. This section will 
focus further on each of these three documents and the changes they have implemented. 
 In 1988, the first of the three Basel Accords was published. The main focus of this 
document was credit risk specifically, which was believed to be the best practice for handling 
credit risk. This document laid out a framework known as risk weighting that would recommend 
banks keep a “minimum” amount of capital in reserve depending on what assets they were 
holding in order to safe guard them from the risk of borrower default. This document was 
divided into three distinct sections; the first being “the constituents of capital”. The Basel Accord 
recommended that 50% of a bank’s capital be “Tier 1”, while the other 50% should be “Tier 2”. 
Tier 1 capital is defined as “a core element comprised of equity capital and published reserves 
from post-tax retained earnings” (Balin 2013). The second type of capital is more broad and 
includes, “reserves created to cover potential loan losses, holdings of subordinated debt, hybrid 
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debt/equity instrument holdings, and potential gains from the sale of assets purchased through 
the sale of bank stock” (Balin 2013). 
 The second portion of Basel I laid out risk weighting. Basel I created a five tier system 
that allowed banks to classify all of their assets and be able to hold the proper amount of capital. 
The system assigned a 0, 10, 20, 50, or 100 percent weight, depending on the riskiness of the 
underlying asset. The final pillar in Basel I was the “target standard ratio”, which created 
“minimum standard should be set now which international banks generally will be expected to 
achieve” (Basle 1988). The target standard is a ratio of capital to weighted risk assets.  The 
committee agreed that a ratio of 8%, with 4% being Tier 1 capital, was the minimum amount 
needed to protect banks from credit risk. These three pillars are the main ideas presented in Basel 
I, and they are built upon in Basel II and III. Generally speaking, Basel II and III increase the 
restrictions presented in Basel I, which were found to be too lenient. 
Basel II 
 In 1999, the Basel Committee proposed a new accord, Basel II, which responded to some 
of the criticism of Basel I and provided a more complete framework of capital controls for the 
banking industry. The second accord followed the first in its utilization of a pillar structure. The 
first pillar of Basel II laid out minimum capital requirements. The goal was to implement 
restructured capital requirements that adjusted the risk weighting system, and to erase loopholes 
that banks had been using to avoid proper implementation of the capital requirements. 
Basel II also introduced the idea of internal incentivized risk weighting, known as the 
Internal Ratings Based Approach. Using this method, not only could banks create their own 
weighting systems with additional help from regulators, they could forgo the additional 6% of 
capital reserves required by using the standardized system. There are two possible IRBA 
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approaches: the Foundation IRB and the Advanced IRB. The IRB approach benefited both sides 
for multiple reasons. The banks were incentivized to take on more customers of all types, their 
profits grew because the reserve requirements were smaller, and self-regulation was possible. 
The regulators benefited because less regulation was needed when banks implemented and 
followed these guidelines. 
 Basel II’s guidelines extend into the operational risk of banks as well. Three different 
methods were used to evaluate operational risk: Basic indicator Approach, Standardized 
Approach, and the Advanced Measurement Approach. The Basic indicator required that banks 
hold capital equivalent to 15% of the average gross income of the bank over the past three years. 
This percentage was adjusted based on regulator’s decisions. The standardized approach applied 
a weight to each business line a bank had, with the riskier departments receiving a higher weight. 
The Advanced Measurement Approach is a parallel to the IRB, but for operational risks.  
 Lastly, Pillar 1 discussed market risk. Basel created two categories for market risk, the 
first being fixed income securities, and the second includes equities and foreign exchange. It is 
recommended that banks use Value at Risk (VaR) to evaluate fixed income securities, and allow 
banks to generate their own weights using this measure. For banks that did not want to use VaR, 
the Basel Committee recommended two different methods. When dealing with interest rate risk, 
the weight was tied to the time until maturity, with longer maturity assets receiving higher 
weights. To deal with volatility, suggested weights were tied to the underlying credit rating of 
the bond. These were all the changes included for Pillar 1 in Basel II. 
 Pillar II reviews bank-regulator interactions and gives regulators more power in two 
areas. The first is supervision over banks, and the second is in the risk weighting process. 
“Regulators are given the power to oversee the internal risk evaluation regimes proposed in Pillar 
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I and change them to the simpler, more conservative “bucket-based” approaches if they deem a 
bank unable to manage its credit, market, and operational risks independently” (Balin, 2013). 
Regulators can also review a bank’s capital assessment policy when they see fit, and are given 
the mandate to hold senior management responsible if a bank misrepresents its risk positioning. 
“Moreover, banks are charged with drafting their own risk profiles, and if this reporting is not 
done, authorities have the right to penalize the at-fault bank” (Balin 2013). Two additional 
powers are given to regulators by Basel II. The first allows regulators to increase capital 
requirements for a bank if the bank is not following the reserve requirements. The second allows 
regulators to intervene and implement a solution if a bank’s reserves fall below the required 
levels. 
 The final pillar of Basel II tried to increase bank transparency with the public. It was 
recommended that previous reports and statistics that were not released to the public now be 
made available. These included: “the aggregate amounts of surplus capital (both Tier 1 and Tier 
2) held by a bank, risk-weighted capital adequacy ratios, reserve requirements for credit, market, 
and operational risk, and a full description (with assumptions) of the risk mitigation approaches 
of a bank are recommended for quarterly release” (Balin 2013). This forces banks to be held 
accountable for the actions they are taking with regards to assets. Subsequently, the public could 
help police internal bank activities. This sums up the changes made in Basel II that were further 
modified by Basel III. 
Basel III 
 Basel III was implemented in 2010 in response to the financial crisis. “The purpose of 
Basel III is to remedy the regulatory capital and liquidity failures that resulted in the 2007-2009 
global financial crisis” (Eubanks 2010). “Specifically, the central part of the Basel III regulatory 
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reform package is to establish the minimum regulatory capital and liquidity requirements that 
banks must hold to absorb unexpected losses” (Eubanks 2010).  
 One of the changes Basel III implemented was a change to tier 1 capital (defined in the 
Basel I discussion). Previously, a loophole allowed banks to look like they had a healthy amount 
of tier 1 capital, but in reality, they lacked the proper amount of tangible equity. “The financial 
crisis demonstrated that the resources to cushion against credit losses and write-downs came out 
of retained earnings, which is a part of a bank’s tangible equity base” (Eubanks 2010). Basel III 
essentially eliminates this loophole by shortening the list of capital allowed in tier 1. The goal 
was to as strictly as possible, only allow tangible equity to be allowed in this category. In 
addition to this change, Basel III also increased the minimum common equity a bank must hold 
from 2.5% to 4.5%. 
 In order to better protect banks during poor financial times, Basel III added a capital 
buffer that was required on top of the previous minimum total capital. This buffer was intended 
to be used in times of financial distress when the bank incurs losses. However, once the capital 
buffer had been reduced, the bank was required to build it back up. 
An additional feature that was included in Basel III with regards to the capital buffer was 
making the capital buffer countercyclical. This measure was included because the restrictions 
implemented by these accords can counteract against monetary policy. If an economy is 
contracting, Basel III recommends higher levels of capital because assets are riskier. However, if 
an economy is contracting, monetary policy is conducted looking to increase lending. These two 
actions do not work well together, which makes the capital buffer important. Similar to the 
capital buffer, this countercyclical buffer can range from 0% to 2.5% of total risk weighted 
assets. The buffer changes based on the state of the economy. In times of expansion, the buffer 
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grows, and in contractionary times, it shrinks. Additionally, the idea of asset specific buffers was 
introduced, where if an asset became riskier, then the capital required for them grew. In total, if 
the countercyclical buffer was at 2.5%, the total amount asked to be held by banks would equal 
13%. Another change Basel III implemented was a new liquidity requirement. This was created 
because even with banks following Basel II’s guidelines, they still experienced liquidity 
problems during the tough financial years. This leads to the last major implementation of Basel 
III, the global leverage ratio.  
 This leverage ratio was introduced because banks were able to meet requirements while 
using too much leverage to finance loans. This problem was multiplied, “when banks were 
forced by market conditions to reduce their leverage that the system increased the downward 
pressure in asset prices. This exacerbated the decline in bank capital and the contraction in 
available credit” (Eubanks 2010). “The leverage ratio addresses endogenous risk and the overall 
health of a banking system, as opposed to exogenous risk, which only affects the health of an 
individual institution” (Walker 2013). The ratio used is gross capital divided by average total 
consolidated on-balance sheet assets. This ratio required additional capital to be held depending 
on how leveraged the bank was.  
 The additional regulations implemented in Basel I and II ended up being a problem once 
the financial crisis occurred. More regulations made it feel like banks were making safer 
investments. This gets factored into market perception making investors believe that financial 
risk is being mitigated. Once the financial crisis hit, investors realized this was not the case, and 
the added value from misplaced market perception quickly evaporated. After the crash, investors 
felt betrayed and had a more negative outlook, causing the same assets that were overvalued to 
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be significantly undervalued. This briefly summarizes the role the first two Basel Accords 
played. 
Debt and Market Perception 
Debt 
Sovereign debt is defined as “The amount of money that a country’s government has 
borrowed, typically issued as bonds denominated in a reserve currency” (Oxford Dictionary) 
Traditionally, government debt is seen as a mechanism that can be used to finance spending, but 
as debt grows, it is believed that market perception worsens. This makes it important to 
understand a few different ways government debt affects a country. In the short run, additional 
government spending boosts the aggregate demand for goods and services. This results in a 
multiplier effect as the money gets spent by individuals, resulting in an additional boost to 
aggregate demand. In recent times, an increase in government spending has been heavily 
associated with recessions, specifically with the goal of getting out of them more quickly. In 
addition to the short run effect, a long run effect exists as well. Increases in aggregate demand 
end up raising interest rates which crowds out investment of the economy. Eventually, with a 
lower capital stock (a result of the reduction in investment), output ends up falling to a lower 
level because of a reduction in infrastructure. These two effects are the most common when 
discussing sovereign debt, but other implications need to be explored. Elmendorf and Mankiw 
(1998) state different effects caused by government debt.  
The first is based off of the idea that countries with high levels of debt often are required 
to pay higher interest rates. Elmendorf and Mankiw (1998) state that in order to get these rates 
down, governments may be pressured to use expansionary monetary policy to monetize some of 
the debt. In this scenario, even with debt shrinking, market perception worsens because the 
increase in the money supply thereby raises inflation. Theoretically, inflation in an economy 
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decreases confidence and therefore has an effect on market perception. The second effect of debt 
is that it causes higher taxes in the future in order to service it. This would occur if governments 
decided not to monetize the debt, and used higher tax revenues to pay off the debt and servicing 
costs instead. At first, this method may seem insulated from market perception, but with higher 
taxes and a fall in consumption, output will contract, and the contraction may result in a negative 
outlook for a countries economy. If we look at financing debt through bond sales, we see that 
regardless of how governments pay off the debt, there is a possibility of a negative impact on 
market perception.  
The third claim is that governments spend less carefully when using debt to finance 
projects. Careless spending leads to the need for additional financing. This creates a vicious 
cycle that eventually results in a negative impact on market perception. A final claim is that 
rising debts cause a reduction in international confidence. This confidence reduction comes from 
a few places. As stated earlier, increased inflation from monetization will hurt international 
confidence through changes in the exchange rate. Additionally, higher levels of debt are 
associated with higher probability of default, which hurts confidence and affects the market 
perception. 
Four ideas are presented above that are theoretical side effects of rising debt. Most of 
these effects can be directly linked to a negative impact on market perception through a story. 
Establishing this link provides reason to believe that studying debt is crucial to understanding 
market perception. In the section below, market perception is discussed with information taken 
from recent papers to provide insight on how it can be measured. 
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Market Perception 
An example can be very useful when trying to describe market perception since it is an 
obscure concept. Imagine that there are two countries, A and B. Both of these countries are 
similar in every aspect, including their economies, debt structures, probabilities of default, etc. 
However, if you look at the bonds offered by each, country A is paying 8% interest on its debt, 
while country B is paying 2% interest on its debt. The difference in these interest rates has to be 
explained by something, and this difference is what is considered “market perception”. This 
example helps create a formal definition for market perception which can be put into words as 
the difference in rates paid by two difference countries that are not accounted for by differences 
in debt structure, probability of default, or other financial measures. 
Recent literature on market perception has been largely focused on the financial crisis 
period with specific focus on Europe. A paper written by Aizenman et al. (2011) focuses on the 
pricing of risk in the European Union during the financial crisis with specific focus on the 
periphery countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). Their objective was to 
“determine whether the perception of relatively high sovereign default risk of the fiscally 
distressed Euro area countries, as seen in market pricing of credit default swap (CDS) spreads, 
may be explained by existing past or current fundamentals of debt and deficits relative to tax 
revenues – which we term de facto fiscal space – and other economic determinants” (Aizenman 
et al. 2011). Another paper written by Gonzalo Camba-Méndez and Dobromił Serwa (2014) also 
looked to study the market perception of different countries in Europe, as well as figure out some 
of the drivers behind market perception. To do this, they estimated the probability of default and 
loss given default by looking at credit default swaps. In addition, they also looked at institutional 
influence and contagion in their analysis.  
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Both of these papers used credit default swaps (CDS) instead of bond interest rates to 
measure market perception. A credit default swap is “A credit derivative contract between two 
parties where the buyer makes periodic payments (over the maturity period of the CDS) to the 
seller in exchange for a commitment to a payoff if a third party defaults. Generally used as 
insurance against default on a credit asset, but can also be used for speculation” (Farlex Financial 
Dictionary 2012).  Aizenman et al. (2011) says that they use CDS to measure market perception 
of default risk because, “The spreads represent the quarterly payments that must be paid by the 
buyer of CDS to the seller for the contingent claim in the case of a credit event, in this case non-
payment (or forced restructuring) of sovereign debt, and is therefore an excellent proxy for 
market-based default risk pricing.” Additional studies have been done that further support the use 
of CDS in the analysis of market perception.  
Packer and Suthiphongchai (2003) found that “Under certain conditions, this CDS 
premium should be approximately equal to the credit spread (yield minus risk-free rates) of the 
reference bond of the same maturity.” Alternatively, Fontana and Scheicher (2010) found that 
this difference was not zero during the financial crisis in Europe. Another study by Beber et al. 
(2009) found that when using high frequency data, differences in credit quality explained 
eurozone sovereign yield spreads. Aizenman et al. (2011) suggested that these aforementioned 
studies, “provided evidence that sovereign interest rates and CDS spreads have common 
underlying causes, rather than one driving the other.” 
Additional studies have been done with the goal of linking the macro economy to CDS 
spreads. Brendt and Obreja (2010) found that “economic catastrophe risk” rose during the 
financial crisis years and correlated with increases in CDS spreads. Another study by Michu et 
al. found a strong link between credit rating announcements and fluctuations in CDS spreads. 
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Finally, Amato (2005) found significant relationships between macroeconomic conditions and 
resulting CDS spreads. Finding these linkages is expected, and can help quantify market 
perception. Being able to account for a portion of the CDS spread provides a better idea of how 
much the spreads are affected by market perception instead of other economic factors. Both 
Aizenman et al. (2011) and Camba-Méndez and Serwa (2014) found promising results in terms 
of evidence for differing market perception.  
Aizenman et al. (2011) found evidence that “market-priced risk of sovereign debt as 
measured by CDS spreads is partly explained by fiscal space and other economic determinants.” 
Their conclusions on European countries found mispricing of CDS in the periphery countries 
Evidence was also found that during calm periods, the pricing was unpredictably low, and that 
during the financial crisis, the spreads were unpredictably high. Additionally, they compared the 
periphery countries to five countries outside of Europe with a similar fiscal space, and found that 
the European countries’ risk was priced significantly higher. Camba-Méndez and Serwa (2014) 
also found that during the financial crisis, there were “excessively high CDS spread levels”. Both 
of these findings reinforce the idea that market perception plays a large role in sovereign debt 
pricing, especially in the European Union at a time when there was concern of default because of 
the periphery. 
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III. Data 
The main variables included in the empirical analysis are: five-year Credit Default Swap 
spreads (CDS), Debt to GDP Ratio (debt/GDP), Inflation Rate (Inflation), Tax to GDP ratio 
(tax/GDP), and TED Spread. Annual data was collected for these variables over the years 2005 
to 2014 for 17 European countries. Data for credit defaults swaps for the 17 country sample was 
obtained from Bloomberg terminal. The macroeconomic variables debt/GDP, Inflation, and 
Tax/GDP were obtained from Eurostat, and the TED spread was retrieved from the St. Louis 
FED. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for each variable and each country. For brevity, 
only the average value for each variable from 2005-2014 is listed. It is clear from this table that 
the CDS spreads for Greece are significantly larger than other European countries, even though 
their macroeconomic variable values are not much different for Greece. Since this thesis focuses 
on the European debt crisis, Table 2 presents these averages only for the years 2010-2012. This 
table shows a similar story, but with increased average CDS spreads.  
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IV. Methodology 
In order to estimate the determinants of CDS spreads, a fixed effect regression model is 
used to exploit the panel data structure described in Section III. A fixed effect regression model 
accounts for unobserved heterogeneity that can be attributed to country-specific factors not 
measured in data. It is equivalent to including an indicator variable for all countries in our 
sample (except one that serves as the base group), and it has the effect of eliminating any 
observed and unobserved time-invariant country-specific effects from the regression model. As a 
result, the variation we use to identify our estimates is within-country variation. (i.e. changes in 
independent variables within each country over time). In addition, to show that periphery 
countries had additional effects on their CDS over and above the euro average during crisis 
years, we also add an interaction term for such a country (or group of countries in one 
specification), with an indicator variable for the year (separately for 2010, 2011, and 2012). 
Formally, our benchmark regression model is given by:  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑖 × 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                  (1) 
Yit = Credit Default swap (CDS) spread for country i at time t. 
Xit = is a vector of determinants of country i’s CDS that vary over time 
αi = denotes country fixed effects 
ɣt = is a vector of dummy variables for the years 2010, 2011, and 2012. 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑖: is a vector of indicator variables capturing periphery economies (Greece, 
Portugal, Spain, and Italy. 
ɛit = the error term for country i at year t 
To provide the intuition for the empirical framework, we use the specification that only included 
an interaction term for Greece: 
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𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽1
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃
+ 𝛽2
𝑇𝑎𝑥
𝐺𝐷𝑃
+ 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽4𝑇𝐸𝐷 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐷𝑆 𝐿𝑎𝑔 + 𝛽62010
+ 𝛽72011 + 𝛽82012 + 𝛽9𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑒 × 2010 + 𝛽10𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑒 × 2011 + 𝛽11𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑒
× 2012 +  𝜖𝑖𝑡 
Using this example, the interpretations for the time and interaction dummies are as 
follows: 
𝛽10: Holding all else constant, the CDS spread for Greece in 2010 is 𝛽9 basis points greater than 
the average CDS spread for non-periphery countries in 2010.  
Credit default swap spreads indicate how much a purchaser must spend to insure $10 
million worth of debt. The spreads are in terms of basis points and each basis point is the 
equivalent of $1,000. Therefore, if the spread is 10, it costs the purchasers $10,000 to insure $10 
million worth of sovereign debt.  
In the following discussion, rationale is provided for the inclusion of the independent 
variables in our regression model and the expected sign for each coefficient. In an analysis done 
by Aizenman et. al (2011), a focus was put on “fiscal space”, which included two variables: 
Sovereign debt/tax base and fiscal deficit/ tax base. In this analysis, the debt and tax base are 
used, but they are in terms of percentage of GDP. Logically, the government debt and deficits 
should contribute to fluctuations in CDS spreads. As governments become more indebted, they 
should be considered riskier and spreads should increase. As the debt and deficit grow, 
governments have the choice to pay off debt through money creation, the sale of bonds, or tax 
revenues. Using tax revenues is the only method available that decreases the debt or deficit 
without increasing inflation. However, most of the time the choice is made to use money creation 
or bond sales. This leads to an increase in the debt and deficit or inflation, which should be 
followed by an increase in CDS spreads.  
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Inflation is another important variable to include in the analysis of CDS spreads because 
of its link to decreased confidence. As inflation increases, prices of goods become higher for 
consumers, and this remains true for the governing bodies. Rising inflation decreases the 
purchasing power of a currency at a faster rate. As the purchasing power of a currency decreases, 
confidence declines, which should lead to increases in CDS spreads.  
 Tax/GDP is a logical variable to include because it is an indicator of financial health. As 
the percentage of tax revenue increases, the confidence that a government can pay off its debt 
should increase as well. The effect of this ratio increasing could have a multiplier effect as well. 
As the tax base increases, governments not only have more money to pay off debt, but they also 
have less incentive to use methods such as money creation or bond sales. Reducing the use of 
these methods should lead to an increase in consumer confidence also. 
 The TED Spread is a measure of the difference between a three month futures contract 
for U.S. Treasury bills and a three-month futures contract for eurodollars. Since U.S. Treasuries 
are thought of as risk free, the difference between the two assets is a measurement of default risk. 
As the spread increases, default risk increases, and vice versa. This makes the TED spread a 
logical variable for inclusion. As the spread increases, CDS spreads should also increase, as they 
reflect default risk as well.   
 The lagged CDS value was included to account for pricing during the financial crisis. We 
expect that during the financial crisis the pricing of CDS spreads was no longer linked to 
macroeconomic factors. If this is the case, there is a chance that the previous spread is a large 
predictor of future spreads.  
In order to estimate a measure of market perception of the sovereign debt, we follow 
Aizenman et al. (2011), and estimate the baseline regression model with the time and interaction 
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dummy variables excluded for two time periods. One is over the whole sample (2006-2014), and 
a second is over the pre-crisis years (2006-2009). The coefficient estimates from the pre-crisis 
model are then used with the macroeconomic values of 2010-2012 to compute a predicted value. 
Following Aizenman et. al (2011), we define debt-perception for country i at time t as a ratio of 
actual CDS to the predicted value from our estimated regression model of CDS. 
Formally, 
Debt perception =   Yit/ Ŷit 
Where: 
Yit = actual 5 year CDS spread for country i at year t 
Ŷit = predicted 5 year CDS spread for country i at year t 
Aizenman et. al (2011) argues that the prediction errors uncover discernable patterns 
between both groups of countries as well as individual countries. These prediction errors provide 
evidence whether CDS spreads are over or under predicted. This ratio gives an estimation of the 
debt perception for a country’s sovereign debt during year t. If the ratio is greater than 1, our 
equation under predicted the CDS spread. When under prediction occurs, the ratio measures how 
much market perception increased the CDS spread. As the ratio grows larger, the market 
perception of risk becomes greater. Comparing the size of these ratios provides insight into how 
the market perceives these countries while controlling for other variables. If this ratio is less than 
1, then the market perceives the country’s debt as less risky, which lowers the spread compared 
to what the model predicts. 
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V. Results 
 Results will be broken down into two subsections. The first subsection will present the 
fixed effects regression results, discuss the variable signs, the time and interaction dummies, and 
provide statistical evidence that Greece’s debt was treated differently compared to other 
periphery countries that were believed to have debt problems. The second subsection will 
implement the perception index, used by Aizenman et al. (2011), for the crisis time period (2010-
2012)
3
, to provide an estimate of how much perception factored into each periphery countries’ 
debt.  
In Table 3, we present the estimation results for the baseline model outlined in section 
IV.
4
 The coefficient for the debt/GDP ratio is both significant and positive. This is expected 
because increases in debt should lead to less confidence in a country’s ability to pay its current 
debt. Tax/GDP was insignificant in the model, but the coefficients were all positive. This is a 
counterintuitive result based on the logic explained in the data section.  Inflation was 
insignificant, but had the expected positive sign. The final macroeconomic variable, TED spread, 
was significant and carried a positive coefficient, which was the expected result. 
 Two types of debt-pricing differentials within Europe can be inferred from our estimated 
regression model. The first is the inclusion of time dummies during the crisis period of 2010-
2012. These coefficients show the difference between the average CDS spread in a crisis year 
compared to the other years in the sample. The time dummies for 2010 and 2011 carry values of 
103 and 221 respectively. This indicates that, on average, the CDS spreads in 2011 are 221 basis 
points greater than the other years in the sample. Both of these years are statistically significant 
at the 1% level. The second type of pricing differential in this model is country-specific during 
                                                          
3
 Many believe that the European debt crisis began in January 2010 including: Stracca (2013) and De Santis (2012) 
4
 All standard errors are corrected for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. 
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the crisis years. Dummy variables are included for the four periphery countries over the crisis 
years of 2010-2012. These dummies provide insight into how periphery countries’ CDS spreads 
changed during the crisis years compared to the rest of the countries in the sample set.  
The country this analysis is focused on is Greece, and therefore a comparison between 
Greece and the other periphery countries is important. The interaction coefficients for Greece are 
all statistically significant at the 1% level and are the largest of any of the periphery countries. 
The coefficient for 2011, which is 7,928, is the highest of any coefficient, and is more than 
double that of Greece’s 2012 coefficient of 3,336. Using the same interpretation above for 
Portugal, we find that the CDS spread in 2011 for Greece is 7,928 basis points greater than the 
average spread in 2011. This difference is astonishing considering the fact that the country with 
the next highest coefficient is Portugal at 641. This shows how risky Greece was perceived, even 
compared to other countries that were seen as risky as well. In order to see if Greek coefficients 
were statistically different than other periphery countries, t-tests were performed between the 
periphery countries and Greece for each year. In every case, Greece’s coefficients were 
determined to be different than other countries. This results in two important findings. First, 
when comparing Greece’s CDS spreads from 2010-2012, the Greek spreads are anywhere from 
482 to 7,928 basis points higher than the average countries’ spread depending on the year. The 
second finding is that when comparing Greek spreads to other periphery countries, there is 
statistical evidence that they are larger. These two findings tell us that not only was Greek debt 
treated differently than other countries in Europe, it was treated differently than other European 
countries in financial crisis. 
When looking at the other periphery, all the coefficients on the interaction dummies are 
statistically significant. The coefficients for Portugal range from 110 to 641, and as mentioned 
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above, Portugal is the country with the highest coefficient behind Greece. The major differences 
in coefficients occur when comparing Greece to Spain or Italy. The coefficients for both of these 
countries never exceed 260, while Greece’s lowest coefficient is 482. When looking at the 
evidence, the macroeconomic variables for all of these countries were relatively similar, but this 
regression clearly shows that the spreads for Greek debt were significantly larger. As a result, it 
can be concluded that other factors such as market perception played a large role when 
considering Greek debt.  
Table 4 looks into the possibility of stability issues in pricing CDS during the financial 
crisis. Two models are estimated using the same variables as the baseline model, excluding the 
time and interaction dummies. Three models are presented, with one including the pre-crisis 
years, a second modeling the crisis years, and a third modeling the full sample.  The goal of these 
estimations is to discover if the model can still account for differences in spreads during the 
financial crisis years. 
During the pre-crisis years, the model fits the data well with an R-squared of .61, and the 
fiscal space variable, Debt/GDP, is significant, indicating that macroeconomic factors account 
for variations in spreads. These results change drastically in the model that only includes the 
crisis years. This model reinforces that a structural break occurred during the European debt 
crisis. In this model, the fiscal space measure of Debt/GDP is insignificant along with Tax/GDP 
and Inflation. This indicates that during the crisis years, that risk was being priced based on 
something other than macroeconomic conditions. Similar to the results in Aizenman et al. 
(2011), we find that the TED spread becomes an important variable in determining spreads 
during the crisis years. “The emergence of the TED spread as a key pricing factor in the crisis 
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also suggests that expectations of market volatility jumped during the crisis and that this pushed 
up CDS spreads.” (Aizenman et al. 2011) 
The argument of this paper is that during these years, market perception played a large 
role in pricing risk. In order to test this, the perception methodology presented in section IV is 
used. The expected result is that Greece’s ratios will be greater than 1 and much larger than other 
periphery countries, indicating that Greece’s CDS spreads were significantly larger than they 
should have been based on economic variables.  
 Table 5 presents the results from this index, which generated interesting results. The Euro 
and non-euro ratios are always less than 1, indicating that the predicted spreads were larger than 
the actual spreads, and that markets perceived countries as less risky than they actually were.  
However, an interesting result here is that the ratios of the countries using the euro are always 
smaller than the ratios of countries not on the euro. This means that the market believes that 
being a part of the Euro equates to less risk. The difference in ratios for the Euro group to Non-
euro group is .19 to .4, depending on the year. For example, take a euro country and a non-euro 
country in 2011, and say that both of their predicted spreads are 100. Using the ratios, the actual 
spread for the Euro country would be 37, and the spread for the non-euro country would be 77.  
This is a huge difference indicating how different the market perceives the risk between 
countries in these two groups, and the benefit of being part of the euro.  
 To test the hypothesis that market perception played a larger role in determining Greek 
spreads, indexes were also created for the four periphery countries. Similar to the results found 
with the interaction terms, Italy has the lowest values, followed by Spain, Portugal, and Greece.  
The ratios for Italy range from .21 to .44, which indicates that the markets believed Italy was 
significantly less risky than it would have been if spreads were based purely on economic 
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indicators. This is unsurprising since Italy is a large economy in the European Union, and was 
never believed to be exiting the Euro. The Spanish ratios are larger than Italy, but still well under 
1. They range from .35 to .62, which also indicates that the market perception reduced the spread 
from what it should be given its economic situation.  
 The most interesting cases from this analysis are Portugal and Greece. Portugal’s ratios 
range from .36 to 1. The ratio of one indicates that Portugal’s spread was priced accurately based 
on its economic situation. Since the effect of being in the Euro is clear, Portugal’s spread should 
be greater than this. This ratio of one is the first case of the Euro effect not being great enough to 
convince investors that Portugal was less risky than its economic situation. Unsurprisingly, 
Greece falls into this same category. Greece’s ratios range from .68 to 5.06. It was expected that 
Greece’s ratios would exceed 1, but the factor by which they exceed all of the other countries is 
staggering. In 2011 and 2012, the actual spreads exceed the predicted spreads by a factor of 5.06 
and 4.21. This means that the spreads are five and four times greater than what they should have 
been based on the economic variables. This result is more impressive when considering that the 
highest ratio outside of Greece is only one. It is obvious that Greece is perceived by the market 
very differently than other countries. This result confirms the hypothesis, but what is surprising 
about this result is the magnitude of difference. Even when compared to similar countries with 
bad economies, Greece was perceived very differently. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 The goal of this analysis was to determine the differential treatment that Greece received 
compared to other countries in the Euro that have comparable situations. This was accomplished 
by using two models that quantified both country specific effects and the market perception of 
debt. The first model implemented measured country specific effects for four periphery countries 
in Europe: Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece. This was done with the inclusion of two sets of 
dummy variables; one set for the crisis years (2010-2012), and another for the interaction effects 
between the periphery and the crisis years. These interaction terms capture country and time 
specific effects that can then be compared between countries.  
As expected, the Greece interaction coefficients were statistically larger than any of the 
other three periphery countries. The coefficients for Portugal, Spain, and Italy ranged from 90 to 
642 basis points above average CDS spreads, depending on the year.  These are minuscule 
compared to the Greek coefficients which ranged from 482 to 7,928 basis points above average 
CDS spreads. The coefficients for the other periphery were then tested with the Greek 
coefficients for the three crisis years. These tests statistically proved that the Greek coefficients 
were larger for all three years. 
The second model used was the same baseline model, but with the time and interaction 
dummies excluded. Using the pre-crisis years, this model was used to estimate coefficients that 
could be used to forecast predicted spreads based on a country’s economic factors. The ratio of 
the actual value to the predicted value was used as a measure of market perception. This was 
done for the four periphery countries, countries on the euro, and countries not on the euro. When 
comparing the results for the euro and non-euro groups, we found that the predicted values for 
the euro countries were much greater than the actual values. The non-euro group experienced 
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similar treatment, but not to the same extent. This showed that there is in fact a premium to being 
in the euro. Regardless of a country’s financial situation, there is evidence that being in the euro 
results in the market perceiving a country’s debt as less risky. This reinforced one of the main 
goals of a currency union, which is to eliminate risk.  
The second finding from this analysis confirmed the belief that Greece was perceived as 
riskier by the market. The result from looking at the ratios for four peripheries over the crisis 
years was clear. The only ratios greater than one occurred for Greece in 2011 and 2012. This 
result showed that based on the economic situation, the spreads for Greece were four to five 
times greater than they should have been. The situation in Greece was perceived so poorly that 
even being in the euro did not make markets believe Greece was safe. This most likely stemmed 
from fears of a Greek exit from the euro, but this could not account for the entire difference. 
This paper provided two methods that yield convincing results for differential treatment 
of Greece. The first result showed that effects specific to Greece during the crisis years led to 
high CDS spreads. The second result showed that the market perceived Greek debt significantly 
worse than other periphery countries in Europe. Multiple explanations can be used to explain 
these results, such as a potential Greek exit, unprecedented corruption and debt levels, and 
constant media coverage of the situation. Regardless of the reasoning behind the differential 
treatment, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that it occurred. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2. Crisis Year Descriptive Statistics  
 
Country CDS Average Debt/GDP TED Spread Fiscal/GDP Tax/GDP Inflation
Germany 32.66 72.58 0.52 -1.34 39.00 1.72
Italy 163.73 113.49 0.52 -3.39 41.90 2.00
Spain 152.01 61.68 0.52 -5.21 33.85 2.25
France 61.44 78.75 0.52 -4.31 43.06 1.65
Greece 1657.23 138.32 0.52 -9.04 32.48 2.18
Portugal 280.80 95.33 0.52 -6.34 35.01 1.73
Hungary 249.46 73.31 0.52 -4.77 38.22 4.14
Austria 62.10 75.95 0.52 -2.62 42.28 2.11
Bulgaria 194.16 18.38 0.52 -1.10 28.33 4.31
Iceland 255.70 70.70 0.52 -2.86 36.48 6.15
Sweden 29.82 40.33 0.52 0.45 44.87 1.40
Belgium 84.33 98.20 0.52 -2.69 46.24 2.11
Croatia 246.72 55.88 0.52 -4.78 36.38 2.62
Poland 108.91 50.24 0.52 -4.38 33.47 2.55
Romania 234.44 25.65 0.52 -4.01 28.02 5.40
Slovakia 88.45 40.29 0.52 -3.98 29.50 2.37
Slovenia 132.84 42.10 0.52 -4.62 37.30 2.45
Variable Average Values
Country CDS Average Debt/GDP TED Spread Fiscal/GDP Tax/GDP Inflation
Germany 67.25 79.70 0.28 -1.77 38.73 1.93
Italy 339.99 118.30 0.28 -3.57 42.37 2.60
Spain 345.95 71.67 0.28 -9.77 32.37 2.50
France 138.15 85.50 0.28 -5.57 42.87 2.07
Greece 4687.13 159.20 0.28 -10.07 33.33 2.93
Portugal 680.30 111.27 0.28 -8.10 34.57 2.60
Hungary 428.82 79.90 0.28 -4.10 37.67 4.77
Austria 111.76 82.07 0.28 -3.07 42.07 2.63
Bulgaria 253.44 16.13 0.28 -1.93 26.13 2.93
Iceland 254.43 96.17 0.28 -6.37 34.43 5.90
Sweden 43.79 37.23 0.28 -0.33 43.70 1.40
Belgium 205.75 101.97 0.28 -4.07 46.33 2.77
Croatia 352.08 63.30 0.28 -6.33 35.73 2.23
Poland 167.47 53.90 0.28 -5.37 32.43 3.43
Romania 318.00 33.83 0.28 -5.17 27.63 5.10
Slovakia 159.10 45.33 0.28 -5.27 28.43 2.83
Slovenia 235.50 46.10 0.28 -5.43 37.27 2.33
2010 - 2012 Averages
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Table 3. Fixed Effect Regression 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-value P-value Significance
Debt/GDP 6.44 1.79 3.59 0 ***
Tax/GDP 9.27 12.56 0.74 0.46
Inflation 8.78 9.02 0.97 0.33
TED Spread 165.02 34.19 4.83 0 ***
CDS Lag 0.05 0.04 1.17 0.25
2010 103.68 26.88 3.86 0 ***
2011 221.54 40.54 5.46 0 ***
2012 -8.91 20.95 -0.43 0.67
Greece2010 482.19 48.51 9.94 0 ***
Greece2011 7927.73 83 95.51 0 ***
Greece2012 3336.19 260.57 12.8 0 ***
Portugal2010 332.18 21.72 15.29 0 ***
Portugal2011 641.97 32.65 19.66 0 ***
Portugal2012 110.4 19.39 5.69 0 ***
Spain2010 256.26 28.65 8.94 0 ***
Spain2011 89.9 39.09 2.3 0.02 *
Spain2012 104.08 30.11 3.46 0 ***
Italy2010 96.17 21.02 4.57 0 ***
Italy2011 206.65 29.04 7.12 0 ***
Italy2012 123.46 23.23 5.31 0 ***
R-Squared 0.97 F-stat 243.87 0
Adj-Rsquared 0.74
N 153
Regression for all countries
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Table 4. Stability Regressions 
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Table 5. Perception Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prediction Error = Actual CDS divided by Predicted CDS value
Country/Group 2010 2011 2012
Greece Out of Sample 0.68 5.06 4.21
Italy Out of Sample 0.21 0.44 0.23
Spain Out of Sample 0.62 0.60 0.35
Portugal Out of Sample 0.52 1.00 0.36
Euro Out of Sample 0.16 0.37 0.13
Non-Euro Out of Sample 0.51 0.77 0.32
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